ARTICLE

FAMILY LAW’S DOCTRINES

MELISSA MURRAY†
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1986
I. CREATING A DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD—CALIFORNIA’S
ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT ...................... 1991
II. PUZZLING OVER PARENTHOOD—THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CALIFORNIA UPA IN CASE LAW ............................................... 1994
A. Johnson v. Calvert .................................................................. 1995
B. In re Marriage of Buzzanca ...................................................... 1998
C. In re Nicholas H. and In re Karen C. ....................................... 2000
D. K.M. v. E.G. and Elisa B. v. Superior Court............................2003
E. Jason P. v. Danielle S. ............................................................ 2009
III. FAMILY LAW’S DOCTRINES ..................................................... 2012
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 2017

† Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. This essay was first
presented at the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s “New Doctrinalism: Legal Realism and
Legal Doctrine” Symposium. Many thanks to Shyam Balganesh and the staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review for convening the Symposium and inviting me to participate. I received
many interesting and generative comments at the Symposium. I am especially grateful to Serena
Mayeri, Doug NeJaime, and Hanoch Dagan for helpful conversations and feedback. Lydia
Anderson-Dana, Maya Khan, and Sheila Menz furnished superlative research assistance. Michael
Levy, of the Berkeley Law Library, went above and beyond the call of duty to locate sources.

(1985)

1986

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1985

INTRODUCTION
The father of the American law school, Christopher Columbus Langdell,
famously conceptualized the law as akin to science.1 On this account, legal
doctrine was a series of scientific truths that judges systematically revealed
over time. Decades later, the Legal Realists took issue with Langdell’s rigid
conception of legal development.2 In their view, law was not simply a set of
formal doctrines that was applied neutrally. Instead, the Legal Realists
argued that real world concerns—including politics—informed the
application and evolution of legal doctrine.3 Judges thus were not scientists,
faithfully applying doctrine in an evenhanded way, but rather keen political
actors who could—and did—manipulate doctrine to achieve desired
outcomes.4
Today, almost 150 years after Langdell elevated legal doctrine to the
status of scientific truth, this Symposium questions whether doctrine
survives in the present day, or if it has been completely subordinated to the
exigencies of contemporary situations, as the Legal Realists claimed. I
approach these questions from the domain of family law, where the
circumstances that animate case law are often deeply idiosyncratic and
particularized. As Leo Tolstoy observed (in a nonlegal context), “Happy
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”5
Despite the idiosyncratic nature of families and family life, most family
law scholars and practitioners would agree that there is a robust body of
family law doctrine, as evidenced by the work of federal and state courts
and the many efforts to codify various family law principles into statutes.
While this growing body of state and federal law6 plays an important role in
1 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887)
(declaring that “law is a science”). As early as 1871, Langdell had taken a similar position. See
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, at vi (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871) (“Law, considered as a science, consists of
certain principles or doctrines. . . . Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow
degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries.”).
2 For a discussion of Legal Realism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927–1960 (1986).
3 See id. at 164 (discussing the legal realist view that the personalities and past experiences of
judges—as opposed to legal rules—play a paramount role in the development of legal doctrines).
4 Id.
5 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds., Constance
Garnett trans., Modern Library 2000) (1877).
6 Traditionally, state statutes and adjudications by state tribunals have been regarded as the
principal sources of family law doctrine. See, e.g., Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 197, 197 (1999) (“Under our federalist system, the axiom has it, family law resides
within the province of the states.”); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1787, 1821 (1995) (“From the earliest days of the Republic until the recent past, family law has
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the adjudication and resolution of familial disputes, it is not the only source
of family law doctrine.
In this Article, I offer a more nuanced view of the field and the role of
doctrine in it. Although there is a robust body of family law doctrine,
including judge-made case law,7 various state family law codes,8 federal
statutory law,9 and federal constitutional law,10 as well as the model codes that
unquestionably belonged to the states.”). Over time, however, a growing number of federal actors
have participated in the articulation of family law principles and doctrines. See Judith Resnik,
“Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721
(1991) (noting that although state law directly regulates families, “federal law does govern a host of
legal and economic relations that do affect and sometimes define family life”).
7 See generally, e.g., Family Law in the Fifty States 2011–2012: Case Digests, 46 FAM. L.Q. 543
(2013) (compiling examples of case law developments in areas such as adoption, child support, and
custody).
8 See, e.g., Family Law in the 50 States, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/family_
law/resources/family_law_in_the_50_states.html (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/GT84-PXTB (summarizing family law statutes in each state, including statutory
provisions related to alimony, custody, child support, property division in divorce, and visitation
rights).
9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2012) (making domestic abuse a federal crime when the
perpetrator crosses state lines); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(2012) (extending full faith and credit to child custody determinations); Child Support
Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669 (2012) (establishing national program to aid states in
developing and implementing child support enforcement policies and procedures); Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5106i (2012) (establishing comprehensive
federal program directed toward the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect); Family
Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401–10415 (2012) (providing federal funding
to states to address the problem of family violence); Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (repealed 1996)
(prohibiting state agencies from denying foster or adoptive placements solely on the basis of race).
10 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-32 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(upholding a statutory presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband
is the husband’s child and allowing only the husband or wife to rebut that presumption); Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-34 (1984) (holding that concern for the effects of racial prejudice
cannot justify removing a child from the custody of an otherwise fit parent); Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 99-102 (1982) (invalidating a state statute providing that a paternity suit for purposes
of obtaining child support for an illegitimate child must be brought within one year of birth);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that a state may terminate the rights of
natural parents only if it can “support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence”);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979) (striking down a state statute permitting an
unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their child by withholding
consent); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266-76 (1978) (upholding a state law conditioning the
inheritance of illegitimate children from their father on a filiation order made during father’s
lifetime); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute
requiring residents subject to child support orders to obtain court approval before marrying);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1978) (holding that equal protection does not require
that the unwed father of an illegitimate child have the same authority as a married or divorced
father to veto adoption); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977) (striking
down a city housing ordinance barring extended family members from living together); Stanton v.
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often inspire law reform,11 the legal rules that these forms enshrine often
assume and privilege a particular family model—marriage and the biological
family produced in marriage. When families depart from the marital and
biological model on which these doctrines rest, the assurances and
predictability of legal doctrine evaporate. In these circumstances, the
question of doctrine—of legal truths—becomes deeply contested as courts
confront scenarios that require them to grapple with the fraught question of
how to apply doctrine in light of real world concerns and the particular
circumstances of litigants’ lives.
This aspect of family law is perhaps most evident in the recent shift
toward a more functional understanding of the family.12 In recent years,
courts and policymakers have taken affirmative steps to recognize the way
in which groups may function in the manner of families—and indeed, may
consider themselves to be family—even where they have not comported
with the formal indicia that traditionally are used to establish family
status.13 For example, in the 1986 case Braschi v. Stahl Associates, the New
York Court of Appeals concluded that two gay men could be considered
“family members” for purposes of a local rent control ordinance because
they comported themselves in the manner of spouses.14 Similarly, in 2002,
the American Law Institute published its Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, which relied on a more functional understanding of the family in

Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (striking down a state child support statute providing that
daughters attain majority at eighteen but sons attain majority at twenty-one); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 649-59 (1972) (holding that the state was barred from taking custody of the children
of an unwed father, absent a hearing and particularized finding that the father was an unfit
parent); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (striking down state laws prohibiting interracial
marriage).
11 See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) (providing a model adoption code); UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT (1983) (providing a model framework for establishing the shared property rights
of both spouses during a marriage and upon dissolution); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973)
(providing a model code for determining parentage).
12 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1453, 1484 (2014) [hereinafter Appleton, Leaving Home] (“Function and performance of
‘family’ have become important criteria for legal recognition, diminishing the once exclusive
emphasis on formalities, such as ceremonial marriage.”).
13 See, e.g., Hann v. Hous. Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (concluding that an
unmarried couple and their children were a family for purposes of public housing eligibility);
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116, 122-23 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing a contract for support between
unmarried cohabitants).
14 See 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (“Appellant and Blanchard lived together as permanent life partners for more than 10 years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by friends
and family, as spouses.”).
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order to identify basic principles for guiding disputes involving, among
other things, relationship dissolution and child custody.15
Critically, however, this functional turn has involved more than just
efforts to resolve familial disputes in a more equitable fashion. In addition,
courts have gradually integrated the emphasis on function into family law
doctrine itself.16 That is, the emphasis on function is not merely a
supplement to the family law that was originally organized around the
formal categories of marriage, biological parenthood, and heterosexuality.
Instead, the functional turn has actually reshaped the law, embedding the
logic of functionality into the doctrine itself. Thus, in trying to move
beyond doctrine, courts actually have transformed the doctrine so that these
exceptions have become part of the rules that govern everyone.
To elaborate on these observations, this Article offers a case study of the
evolution of the doctrine of legal parenthood in California to show how
courts have grappled with the fixed doctrine of parenthood and the rapidly
changing realities of family life. In 1975, California adopted provisions of
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), codifying them, with some modest
modifications, as part of its Family Code.17 The UPA was rooted in the
assumption that parent–child relationships would emerge within marital
families or, if not, through nonmarital heterosexual reproduction.18 But
California’s doctrine of legal parenthood quickly confronted the complications of modernity.19 Technological advances in the science of reproduction,
coupled with changes in the demographics of family life, pushed the boundaries

15

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN§§ 2.01, 3.01 (2002) (explaining that these guiding principles encompass both formal and
functional conceptions of family).
16 See Appleton, Leaving Home, supra note 12, at 1486-87 (“Exemplifying family law’s
functional turn, concepts such as de facto parents, parents by estoppel, psychological parents,
intent-based parenthood, and in loco parentis status can establish legal parentage based on parenting
conduct.” (citations omitted)).
17 Provisions of the UPA are now codified in California’s Family Code. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7600–7730 (West 2004 & Supp. 2013).
18 See Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing California’s Uniform Parentage Act to Protect
Children Born Into Nontraditional Families, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 139, 142
(2005) (noting that the UPA “did not anticipate all of the future permutations in the creation of
biological and social families,” such as lesbian and gay families, but instead focused on parentage in
the context of heterosexual relationships).
19 See, e.g., Megan S. Calvo, Note, Uniform Parentage Act—Say Goodbye to Donna Reed: Recognizing Stepmothers’ Rights, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 773, 787-88 (2008) (noting that the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc), involved “a
situation that was unforeseen when the UPA was drafted”).
DATIONS
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of the legal doctrine of parenthood, prompting courts to adapt doctrinal
rules to account for the realities of family life.20
Although these changes produced reappraisals of family law doctrine,
courts nevertheless emphasized—and indeed, entrenched—crucial assumptions associated with the traditional marital family. In particular, even as
courts credited departures from the traditional marital family configuration
in their interpretations of the UPA, they nonetheless emphasized the degree
to which these families comported with the basic structure and functions of
the marital family.21 Moreover, in interpreting the various provisions of the
UPA, courts underscored a traditional function of the marital family—the
privatization of support and care of children.22
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief history of
the UPA, including its adoption and codification in California in 1975. Part II
then traces the California courts’ evolving interpretations of certain UPA
provisions in a series of cases involving the determination of parentage.
Over time, California courts revised and modified existing interpretations
of these statutory provisions in order to accommodate changes in
technology and in the structure of the family. But even as the courts’
interpretations of these statutory provisions evolved, what remained
consistent was the underlying commitment to the marital family form, the
two-parent dyad, and the privatization of dependency within the family.
Part III explores these commitments to marriage, the marital family, and
20 See id. at 787 (discussing Johnson, where the California Supreme Court interpreted
California’s UPA provisions to hold “that when both the genetic relationship with the child and
gestation of the child do not abide in one woman, the woman who intended to create and raise the
child is the legal mother”).
21 See, e.g., Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d
932, 940-41 (Cal. 2002) (vesting legal parenthood in a man who was not biologically related to the
child on the grounds that he had functioned in the manner of a father, living with the child and
the child’s mother and holding the child out as his own since the child’s birth); Kern Cnty. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708-09 (Ct. App. 2003)
(determining, in circumstances where the biological parents were unavailable, that a half-sister was
a presumed mother because she had taken care of the child since birth and raised him as her own);
L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,
681-83 (Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing a woman who was not biologically related to the child as a
presumed mother because she had held the child out as her own for years).
22 See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App.
1998) (noting that parentage determinations are intended in part to identify those who are
“obligated to provide maintenance and support for the child”); see also Susan Frelich Appleton,
Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 360 (2012)
[hereinafter Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex] (noting that while the UPA reflected a desire to
remove the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate birth, its focus on identifying parents
inside and outside the marital family “pav[ed] the way for the increasing privatization of
dependency”).
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the privatization of dependency within the family. As I argue, these
commitments, perhaps more so than case law and statutory text, reveal the
true doctrinal framework that has undergirded—and continues to define—
family law.
I. CREATING A DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD—CALIFORNIA’S
ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court began dismantling the legal
impediments that traditionally attended illegitimate birth. In Levy v.
Louisiana23 and a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co.,24 the Court struck down state laws that prohibited illegitimate
children and their parents from recovering under wrongful death claims.25
According to the Court, the distinction drawn between marital and nonmarital birth had no rational relationship to the purpose and administration of
the wrongful death statutes at issue.26 Instead, the Court found that the
distinctions invidiously discriminated against children born out of wedlock,
punishing them for their parents’ “sin[s].”27
The Court’s decisions in Levy and Glona and their progeny have been
credited with ushering in a sea change in the legal approach to illegitimacy.28
Although some scholars debate the extent to which the Supreme Court’s
illegitimacy jurisprudence was revolutionary,29 it certainly influenced the
law of parentage. Partly in response to the Court’s illegitimacy decisions,
23
24
25
26

391 U.S. 68 (1968).
391 U.S. 73 (1968).
Id. at 75-76; Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
See Glona, 391 U.S. at 75 (“[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the
natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of
illegitimacy will be served.” (citation omitted)).
27 Id. (noting that punishing the “sin” of nonmarital sex is the historical reason for the creation of legal impediments based on illegitimacy).
28 See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws
for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 211-12 (2009)
(noting that in the wake of Levy, Glona, and their progeny, the “legal doctrine of ‘illegitimacy’ had
all but disappeared”).
29 See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 413 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, New Illegitimacy] (“Levy and Glona do not
represent a broad shift in law’s understanding of illegitimacy. Instead, both cases are entirely
consistent with law’s persistent skepticism of non-marriage and its veneration of marriage and the
marital family.” (citation omitted)); see also Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution
of the Non-Marital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 104) (on file with
author) (“By focusing on the blamelessness of children, these decisions not only obscured the
constitutional harms of illegitimacy penalties’ detrimental impact on adults, they ignored how
these laws reinforced broader racial, sexual, and socioeconomic inequities that impoverished entire
families.”).
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973.30 In keeping with
the Supreme Court’s skepticism of illegitimacy as a basis for distinguishing
between individuals, the UPA sought to remove distinctions based on the
parents’ marital status at the time of the child’s birth while also providing
ways to establish paternity in circumstances involving unmarried fathers.31
California, like many states, adopted a modified version of the UPA in
1975.32 As Senator Anthony Beilenson, the author of California’s version of
the UPA, noted at its passage, the new law struck “the entire concept of
‘illegitimacy’ . . . from California’s law books.”33 The California law
“repeal[ed] all legal references to legitimacy and illegitimacy and
substitute[d] the concept known as the ‘parent and child relationship’ which
will be used in the future.”34
In this regard, the UPA looked beyond marriage to provide multiple
ways to determine parentage. Women could establish maternity in the
traditional way through gestation and birth.35 But establishing paternity
required more. In the case of marital births, the UPA deployed the traditional marital presumptions in place in most American jurisdictions, which
presumed a woman’s husband to be the father of any child born to her
during the course of the marriage or within three hundred days of its
termination.36 For nonmarital births, however, rather than relying on a
presumption based on the horizontal relationship between two adults, the
30 See Polikoff, supra note 28, at 211 (noting that the critiques of illegitimacy influenced the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which in turn led to the
promulgation of the UPA). Importantly, Harry Krause, an architect of the effort to dismantle legal
impediments based on illegitimacy, was also integrally involved in the development of the UPA.
Id. at 209-211; see also Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families, and Fantasy: The Legacy of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (1991) (discussing Krause’s role in the
UPA’s drafting).
31 See Wald, supra note 18, at 140 (“The primary purpose of the [UPA] was to eliminate the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.”).
32 Jessica Hawkins, My Two Dads: Challenging Gender Stereotypes in Applying California’s Recent
Supreme Court Cases to Gay Couples, 41 FAM. L.Q. 623, 625 (2007).
33 Anthony C. Beilenson, Op-Ed., Archaic Injustice Eliminated, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1975, at
F5.
34 Id.
35 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3(1) (1973) (“The parent and child relationship between a
child and . . . the natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the
child.”); see also Wald, supra note 18, at 141 (“Because the fact of maternity was obvious, social
motherhood—a mother’s relationship with her child—was inextricably linked to a woman’s
biological relationship to her child.”).
36 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4–6 (1973). Meaningfully, the UPA permitted the presumption to be rebutted in certain circumstances. See id. § 4(b) (explaining that a “court decree
establishing paternity of the child by another man” would rebut the presumption).
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UPA fashioned new presumptions based on the parent–child relationship,
including biological connections37 and the father’s conduct toward the
child.38
A critical aspect of the UPA and its adoption in California and
elsewhere was the link between establishing parentage and the attachment
of child support obligations.39 Indeed, as Susan Frelich Appleton has
argued, many of the changes in the treatment of unmarried fathers and
nonmarital children were driven by private welfare concerns.40 If marriage
provided a private welfare system for those children born to married
parents, the UPA’s provisions attempted to construct an analogous system
of privatized support by establishing paternity—and attaching the
obligation of child support—in nonmarital families through the recognition
of biological connections and conduct.
Although the UPA responded to the growing rate of nonmarital
families, it did not anticipate other tectonic shifts in family life. For
example, the statute barely acknowledged the emergence of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs). Indeed, the statute’s one nod to this
aspect of modernity was its provisions relating to the use of artificial
insemination.41 But even there, its contemplation of insemination as a route
to parenthood struck a traditional note. The UPA presumed that
insemination would occur within the context of the marital family. It
provided that the husband of a woman receiving artificial insemination
under a physician’s supervision was presumed to be the legal father of the
37 See id. § 12 (“Evidence relating to paternity may include . . . evidence of sexual intercourse
between the mother and alleged father at any possible time of conception.”).
38 See id. § 4(a)(4) (providing that paternity can be established by a man who “receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”).
39 See Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974) (discussing the
UPA’s “guiding principle” that all children have an equal interest in establishing their right to a
relationship with—and support from—both parents); see also Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond:
The Case for Passage of the New Uniform Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41, 42 (2001) (“[R]esolving
parentage issues has economic implications for the public. Many of the benefits of establishing
parentage whether for marital or nonmarital children are monetary. In the absence of financial
support, a child may need public assistance.”).
40 See Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360 (“If the Supreme Court’s decisions
and the 1973 UPA were child-focused—developments designed to help children of unmarried
parents achieve parity with other children—they also offered welcome changes for the state itself,
paving the way for the increasing privatization of dependency.”). In fact, one of the major
illegitimacy cases concerned nonmarital children’s rights to support. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (“[O]nce a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of
children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient
justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not
married its mother.”).
41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
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child born.42 In adopting various provisions of the UPA, however,
California made a critical change to the model code’s terms, modifying the
provisions dealing with paternity in the context of artificial insemination to
allow unmarried women to use physician-supervised artificial insemination
without vesting the sperm donor with the status of legal father.43
In time, however, it became clear that technology, as well as the
changing demographics of family life, might lead to circumstances in which
the factors relevant to determining parentage could point in different
directions.44 How, then, to resolve the puzzle of parenthood? California
adopted section 4(b) of the UPA, which provided that if two or more
presumptions arose, “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”45 This provision left
much discretion to judges dealing with the often complex factual
circumstances of modern families. In addition, the UPA instructed that,
“[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions . . . applicable to the father and child
relationship apply” to establishing the mother–child relationship.46
Accordingly, presumptions applicable to fathers could apply to mothers.
But as Part II makes clear, even with these guidelines, the California UPA’s
provisions were often inadequate to resolve the pressing issues that arose in
the idiosyncratic circumstances of family life. In such situations, doctrine
could be a guide—and even a tool—for resolving such disputes, but other
interests would also be important decisional factors.
II. PUZZLING OVER PARENTHOOD—THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CALIFORNIA UPA IN CASE LAW
When California adopted the UPA in 1975, the model act reflected an
interest in eliminating distinctions between marital and nonmarital children.47 By emphasizing biological connections and conduct as critical indicia
42 See id. § 5(a) (“If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the
husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”).
43 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”).
44 See Calvo, supra note 19, at 787-88 (discussing the facts of Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993) (en banc), where the court confronted conflicting claims to motherhood—one from the
surrogate who actually gave birth to the child and the other from the biological egg donor).
45 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (1973).
46 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973). California adopted and codified this provision of the
UPA into its Family Code, at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004).
47 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973) (“The parent and child relationship extends equally
to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”); see also id. § 2
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of parenthood, the UPA diminished the importance of marriage for establishing legal parentage.48 Additionally, the emphasis on biology and conduct
as means of establishing parentage provided the state with alternatives—
beyond marriage—for identifying private sources of support for children.49
But while the UPA reflected shifts in the composition of family life, it
assumed that traditional heterosexual reproduction would be the primary
conduit to parenthood.50 As ARTs emerged, California courts struggled to
adapt the UPA’s provisions to the rapidly shifting terrain that these new
modes of reproduction created.51
A. Johnson v. Calvert
In Johnson v. Calvert,52 the California courts grappled with the fraught
question of how to determine parentage in circumstances involving new
reproductive technologies. After a hysterectomy left her unable to carry a
pregnancy to term, Crispina Calvert and her husband, Mark, decided to
pursue in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy.53 In 1990, the Calverts
entered into a surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson, a paid gestational
surrogate. The contract provided that an embryo created using the Calverts’
genetic material would be implanted in Johnson for gestation.54 In exchange
for $10,000 and a $200,000 life insurance policy, Johnson would bear the
child and, upon birth, relinquish “all parental rights” to the child to the
Calverts.55 By the time the child was born, however, relations between the
Calverts and Johnson had deteriorated.56 Shortly after the birth, the
cmt. (“[T]he major substantive sections of the Act[] establish the principle that regardless of the
marital status of the parents, all children and all parents have equal rights with respect to each
other.”); Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 381 (“The 1973 UPA set forth a network of
parentage presumptions applicable to children to whom the presumption of legitimacy did not
apply.”).
48 Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360.
49 See id. (noting that although the UPA was “designed to help children of unmarried parents
achieve parity with other children,” its emphasis on biology and conduct as conduits to parenthood
also permitted new paths for “the increasing privatization of dependency”).
50 In 2000, in an attempt to remedy this oversight, the UPA was amended by responding
directly to the challenges presented by improved genetic testing and the proliferation of ARTs.
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 cmt. (2002) (“Article 7 only applies to children born as the
result of assisted reproductive technologies . . . .”).
51 See Calvo, supra note 19, at 787 (“[E]ven prior to its amendment, the Supreme Court of
California applied the UPA to a situation that was not considered when it was drafted.”).
52 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
53 Id. at 778.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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Calverts and Johnson all filed actions to be recognized as the legal parents
of the child.57
In framing their claims, the parties looked to the UPA provisions that
governed the determination of maternity.58 The Calverts, who had
furnished their genetic material to create the embryo to be implanted and
gestated, based their claim on genetics.59 Conversely, Johnson based her
claim on her status as the gestational mother.60 By the terms of the statute,
which provided that the mother–child relationship “may be established by
proof of . . . having given birth to the child,”61 Johnson appeared to have the
stronger claim. The trial court, however, prioritized genetics, noting that
while Johnson had given birth to the child, the Calverts were the child’s
“genetic, biological and natural” father and mother.62 Accordingly, Johnson
had no “parental” rights to the child, and the surrogacy contract was legal
and enforceable against her claims.63 An intermediate appellate court
affirmed the trial court decision, and Johnson appealed to the California
Supreme Court.64
The California Supreme Court acknowledged the complexities of the
situation: “Both women . . . ha[d] adduced evidence of a mother and child
relationship as contemplated by the Act.”65 In other words, Johnson was a
mother because she had birthed the child, while Crispina Calvert was a
mother by virtue of her biological connection to the child. The trouble, of
course, was that the statute reflected “the ancient dictum mater est quam
[gestation] demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated).”66 As such,
the statute’s understanding of maternity was one in which gestation and
genetics coincided. The statute did not contemplate the complications that
57
58

Id.
Id. at 777-78. Critically, the parties’ decisions to frame their arguments with reference to
the UPA were animated, at least in part, by the broad skepticism of surrogacy agreements that
emerged after the Supreme Court of New Jersey found surrogacy contracts to be unenforceable in
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248-50 (N.J. 1988). Following the controversial decision, courts were
reluctant to make doctrine around surrogacy contracts. In this regard, any impulse toward shifting
family law doctrine in a more contractual direction was effectively foreclosed by the Baby M
backlash and the ensuing effort to reroute surrogacy disputes through the UPA. For a discussion of
this dynamic, see generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009).
59 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
60 Id.
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1991) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a)
(West 2004)).
62 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 781.
66 Id. (citation omitted).
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surrogacy and ARTs would present, and thus did not foresee the possibility
that maternity might one day be bifurcated such that one woman would be a
child’s genetic mother, while another would be its gestational mother.
Confronted with just this situation, the Johnson court retreated from
statutory text and the scientific truths upon which it was based. The court
reasoned that “while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not
the sine qua non of motherhood.”67 In the face of a statutory impasse, the
court turned its attention to “the parties’ intentions.”68 Although the court
refused to address the issue of the surrogacy agreement’s enforceability,69 it
found the agreement relevant for discerning the parties’ intentions
regarding the child.70 The surrogacy agreement made clear that the Calverts
“affirmatively intended the birth of the child” and that Crispina Calvert
“from the outset intended to be the child’s mother.”71
The Johnson court’s articulation of “intentional parenthood” marked a
profound shift in the determination of parentage. Nevertheless, even as it
broke new ground, the California Supreme Court hewed to the traditional
model of dual parentage in rendering its decision.72 While the court
discussed the parties’ intentions at length, it spent hardly any time at all
considering the prospect of vesting legal parenthood in three different
people.73 Indeed, the possibility of a child with three legal parents was an
unorthodox—and unwelcome—outcome. Vesting any of the legal incidents
of parentage in Anna Johnson would invariably “come only at Crispina’s
expense,” and would intrude upon the Calverts’ “procreative choices and
their relationship with the child.”74 In short, the prospect of three, rather
than two, parents would be disastrous, “necessarily detract[ing] from or
impair[ing] the parental bond” between the Calverts and their child.75
The court’s resistance to the prospect of three legal parents gestures
toward two distinct, but related, concerns. On one hand, the court’s
opposition to three legal parents evinced a preference for the familiar
two-parent dyad. And critically, the parental dyad (and the preference for
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 781 n.8 (“To recognize parental rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family
has had little contact since shortly after the child’s birth would diminish Crispina’s role as
mother.”).
73 See id. (“We decline to accept the contention . . . that we should find the child has two
mothers.”).
74 Id. at 786.
75 Id.
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it) reflected deep-seated assumptions that heterosexual marriage and
biological reproduction would—and should—be the most common conduits
to parenthood. Dividing parenthood among three persons was a clear
departure from the traditional family model; tellingly, the court, in its
concern for “the parental bond”76 between the Calverts and the child, made
clear that dividing parenthood between more than two people could
threaten the traditional family structure by inserting an unwelcomed
interloper into the bosom of the family.
But even as the court’s disdain for dividing parenthood among three
people signaled a preference for the traditional family model, it also
reflected a traditional function of the marital family: the privatization of
dependency within the family unit. Although the Johnson court did not
mention it explicitly, it likely weighed the appeal of a stable marital family
against the prospect of three people all vying for a say in the child’s
upbringing or the prospect of Anna Johnson raising the child on her own.
With this calculus in mind, it is unsurprising that the court preferred the
Calverts, who had planned for the child and sought to raise it together
within a traditional marital family structure, over Johnson. The (perceived)
economic and emotional stability of the intact marital family was likely
preferable to the uncertainty posed by three competing parental claims or
the prospect of single motherhood.
B. In re Marriage of Buzzanca
Though a preference for the marital family and the privatization of
dependency was not explicitly expressed in the court’s disposition of
Johnson, it soon emerged as a critical interest in other cases involving
parentage determinations. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca,77 a married couple,
John and Luanne Buzzanca, had an embryo implanted in a surrogate.78
Unlike the circumstances in Johnson, the embryo was not genetically related
to the Buzzancas.79 Shortly after the child, Jaycee, was born, the Buzzancas
ended their marriage, setting the stage for a lawsuit to determine
parentage—and financial responsibility—for Jaycee.80
At trial, all of the parties—the Buzzancas, the surrogate, and the
surrogate’s husband—stipulated that, because they had no genetic
relationship to the child, they were not “biological” parents within the
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
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meaning of the UPA.81 Although Luanne Buzzanca claimed that she and
John were the lawful parents under Johnson’s theory of intentional
parenthood, John “disclaimed any responsibility” for the child, “financial or
otherwise.”82 As the trial court explained, because John had not
“contributed the sperm” and thus “had no biological relationship to the
child,” he was not the child’s legal father and owed no obligations for the
child’s care and upkeep.83 On this logic, the trial court reached “an
extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no lawful parents.”84
On appeal, the intermediate court immediately invoked Johnson’s logic
of intentional parenthood, using it to inform its own interpretation of the
UPA’s provisions.85 According to the appellate court, the trial court had
focused unduly on whether there was a biological relationship between John
and Jaycee, completely neglecting “the substantial and well-settled body of
law holding that there are times when fatherhood can be established by
conduct apart from giving birth or being genetically related to a child.”86 In
the appellate court’s view, although the Buzzancas were genetically
unrelated to Jaycee, their intentions and conduct provided a basis for
vesting them with the rights and obligations of parenthood.87 Accordingly,
Luanne Buzzanca was the child’s lawful mother because she “caused Jaycee’s
conception and birth by initiating the surrogacy arrangement.”88 And if
Luanne was Jaycee’s mother, then John, her husband at the time of the
surrogacy agreement and implantation, was the legal father.89
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court analogized the
Buzzancas’ circumstances to the statutory provisions concerning artificial
insemination in the context of an intact marriage. By the UPA’s terms, “[i]f,
under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”90 Analogizing surrogacy
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“The same rule which makes the husband the lawful father of a child born because
of his consent to artificial insemination should be applied here—by the same parity of reasoning
that guided our Supreme Court in [ Johnson]—to both husband and wife.”).
86 Id. (second emphasis added).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 291.
89 See id. (“John caused Jaycee’s conception every bit as much as if things had been done the
old-fashioned way.” (citation omitted)).
90 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 1994).
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to artificial insemination and invoking the traditional marital presumption,
the appellate court concluded that in a situation involving “a man and
woman who were married at the time of conception and signing of the
surrogacy agreement,” the rights and obligations of parenthood could
attach, even in the absence of a biological connection.91
But even as the Buzzanca court wedded the logic of intentional
parenthood to statutory presumptions that were informed by marriage and
marital conduct,92 it also prioritized more quotidian concerns. Recall that
the trial court reached the “extraordinary” conclusion that Jaycee was a
“legal orphan” with no parents.93 The intermediate appellate court
immediately identified the flaw in this logic. With no lawful parents, the
child—and the burden of her upkeep—would “fall on the taxpayers.”94 It is
little wonder that the Buzzanca court blended the UPA’s marital
presumptions with Johnson’s intentional parenthood doctrine to avoid the
unappealing outcome of a child left dependent on the state for her upkeep.
After all, as the Buzzanca court noted, the UPA’s provisions were
promulgated with an eye toward ensuring “that parents will live up to their
support obligations,” rather than “leaving the task to the taxpayers.”95
C. In re Nicholas H. and In re Karen C.
As in Buzzanca, the prospect of a child dependent on the state for his
care and provision informed the court’s disposition of In re Nicholas H.96 In
many ways, Nicholas H. exemplified family law’s functionalist turn, as the
facts of the case perfectly captured the changing demographics of the
family, as well as marriage’s diminished role as a conduit to parenthood.
The case involved Thomas and Kimberly, who had become a couple while
Kimberly was pregnant by another man.97 After the child, Nicholas, was
born, Thomas and Kimberly lived together and raised Nicholas together,

91
92

Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287 & n.11.
The Buzzanca court’s interpretation of the UPA’s presumptions in tandem with Johnson’s
notion of intentional parenthood was consistent with an earlier decision, Moschetta v. Moschetta (In
re Marriage of Moschetta), 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). There, the court “decline[d] to
enforce the traditional surrogacy contract . . . because to do so would mean we would have to
ignore both the analysis used by our Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert and the adoption statute
that requires a formal consent to a child’s adoption by his or her birth mother.” Id. at 901.
93 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282, 284.
94 Id. at 284.
95 Id. at 290.
96 Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal.
2002).
97 Id. at 934.
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though they never married.98 In time, the relationship soured amidst
Kimberly’s drug use and incarceration, and episodes of domestic violence.99
Because of Kimberly’s instability, a juvenile court removed Nicholas from
her care.100 Thomas petitioned for custody of the boy, but Kimberly
objected on the ground that because Thomas was not the boy’s biological
father, he could not claim parental rights.101 Thomas conceded that he had
no biological connection to Nicholas,102 but argued that under
section 7611(d) of California’s UPA, “the father-son relationship he ha[d]
developed with Nicholas qualified him as a presumed father.”103 The
juvenile court credited Thomas’ functionalist argument;104 an intermediate
appellate court, however, rejected the conduct-based claim to parentage
because “the presumption set forth in section 7611 is a presumption that a
man is the natural, biological father of the child in question.”105 Because
Thomas admitted that he had no biological connection to Nicholas, the
presumption established under section 7611(d) was, in the appellate court’s
view, rebutted.106
The California Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.107 It explained
that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that the absence of
a biological connection between Thomas and Nicholas “necessarily rebutted
[section 7611(d)’s] presumption.”108 Although section 7611(d)’s presumption
could be rebutted by evidence that the claimant lacked a biological connection to the child, by the UPA’s terms, such a rebuttal could be deployed
only “in an appropriate action.”109 According to the court, the circumstances
were not an appropriate action in which to rebut the presumption of
parenthood.110

98 Id.
99 Id. at 934-35.
100 Id. at 935-36.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Alameda Cnty.

Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d
126, 128 (Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002); cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994)
(providing that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if “[h]e receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”).
104 See Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 935 (“[T]he juvenile court found that the presumption under
7611(d) that Thomas was Nicholas’s natural father had not been rebutted.”).
105 Nicholas H., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
106 Id. at 142.
107 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 934, 941.
108 Id. at 935.
109 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(a) (West 1994).
110 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 934.
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But what made the circumstances inappropriate for rebutting the
presumption of biological parenthood? As the court noted, Nicholas’s
biological parents were unavailable to care for him.111 Unemployed and
frequently homeless, Kimberly was “a frail reed for Nicholas to lean
upon.”112 And while Kimberly had named a former partner, Jason, as
Nicholas’s biological father, “Jason ha[d] not come forward to affirm that
claim, and, indeed, ha[d] not even been located.”113 In this regard, Thomas
was “the constant in Nicholas’s life.”114 Rebutting section 7611’s
presumption for lack of a biological connection would render Nicholas
“fatherless and homeless.”115 Faced with the grim prospect of a child who
would otherwise become a ward of the state, the court interpreted the
UPA’s provisions broadly enough to allow a man with no biological
connections to establish paternity based solely on his conduct over time.116
A few months later, in In re Karen C.,117 a California intermediate
appellate court built upon Nicholas H., applying its logic in a gender-neutral
fashion to conclude that a woman who raised a child given to her at birth by
another woman could similarly be the child’s presumed parent under
section 7611.118 As in Nicholas H., the Karen C. court evinced a deep
discomfort with the prospect of rejecting a claim of legal parenthood in
circumstances where doing so would render the child a legal orphan.119 At
bottom, the court noted, “[t]he judicial determination of paternity is . . . a
mixture of a search for genetic truth and the implementation of the strong
public policies favoring marriage and family stability, and disfavoring labels
of illegitimacy.”120 With these concerns in mind, a judgment establishing
parentage need not be rooted in biological truths. To reach an optimal

111 See id. at 934 (discussing the “harsh result” that would ensue if the court based parentage
solely on the biological relationship).
112 Id. at 935.
113 Id. at 936.
114 Id. at 935.
115 Id. at 934.
116 See id. at 941 (concluding that the California legislature, in enacting the UPA provisions
allowing for the rebuttal of a man’s presumed status as a natural father, was “unlikely to have had
in mind an action like this . . . in which no other man claims parental rights to the child”).
117 L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 2002).
118 See id. at 680-81, 683 (summarizing Nicholas H., determining that its “principles should
apply equally to women,” and vacating the lowers court’s order denying the existence of a mother–child
relationship).
119 See id. at 679 (noting that “Karen has effectively been made an orphan” and therefore “she
has an obvious interest in a legal determination of whether Leticia is her mother”).
120 Id. at 680.
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outcome for the child and ensure the privatization of support, the
determination of parenthood could, in some cases, “be a decretal fiction.”121
D. K.M. v. E.G. and Elisa B. v. Superior Court
Critically, both Nicholas H. and Karen C. were juvenile dependency
cases, a posture that perhaps explains the courts’ interest in establishing
parenthood, even in the absence of a biological connection. In most
dependency cases, the failure to identify an appropriate legal guardian will
result in the child becoming a ward of the state. But even as the dependency
context likely colored the decisions in Nicholas H. and Karen C., the
interpretations of the UPA that prevailed in those cases proved instructive
outside of the dependency context—including in circumstances involving
the parentage rights of same-sex couples.122
In K.M. v. E.G., K.M. provided her ova so that they could be fertilized
with sperm from an anonymous donor.123 The resulting embryos were
implanted in her lesbian partner, E.G., who became pregnant and carried
the resulting twins to term.124 When their relationship ended, E.G. argued
that, despite the use of K.M.’s ova, the couple had undertaken IVF with the
understanding that E.G. would be the sole parent of any resulting
children.125 Indeed, as the Court of Appeal noted, California’s version of the
UPA specifically provided for the prospect of single motherhood by
extinguishing the parental claims of anonymous sperm donors who
provided genetic material for artificial insemination.126 On this view, the
lower court concluded that K.M. was akin to an anonymous sperm donor,
who under section 7613(b) was not considered “the natural [parent] of a
child thereby conceived.”127
K.M., by contrast, claimed that regardless of the law’s provisions for
single parenthood, she and E.G. planned to raise any resulting children
together128—indeed, they had raised their children together until their
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
See infra notes 123-168 and accompanying text.
117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 676.
See id. at 677 (noting that the Court of Appeal observed that “the status of K.M. . . . . is
consistent with the status of a sperm donor under the [Uniform Parentage Act], i.e., treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived” (omission and alteration in
original)); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004) (“The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”).
127 See supra note 126.
128 K.M., 117 P.3d at 679.

2004

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 1985

relationship ended.129 In this regard, K.M. not only had a biological connection to the children E.G. had birthed, she also had received them into her
home and held them out as her own. Accordingly, K.M. argued that she was
a parent under both the doctrine of intentional parenthood established in
Johnson and section 7611(d) of the California UPA.130
At trial and on the initial appeal, the courts credited E.G.’s
interpretation of the statute.131 Those courts held that K.M.’s status “was
analogous to that of a sperm donor, who is treated as a legal stranger to a
child.”132 Neither court made much of K.M.’s claim that she was a presumed
parent under section 7611(d) because she had received the children into her
home and held them out as her natural children.133 Nor did the lower courts
entertain K.M.’s argument that she and E.G. had intended to parent the
twins jointly and that E.G. was thus estopped from now denying K.M.’s
claim to parenthood.134 According to the Court of Appeal, “substantial
evidence supports the trial courts [sic] factual finding that only E.G.
intended to bring about the birth of a child whom she intended to raise as
her own.”135
The California Supreme Court, however, took a different approach,
concluding that K.M. was a legal parent.136 In so holding, it drew on past
precedents interpreting California’s UPA, including Johnson and
Buzzanca.137 As in Johnson, both K.M. and E.G. had biological connections
to the children. K.M., who furnished ova for the IVF procedure, was the
genetic mother, while E.G., who bore the children, was the gestational
129
130

Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 677, 679; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004) (presuming that one is a
natural parent of a child if “[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child”).
131 K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
132 K.M., 117 P.3d at 677.
133 See id. at 683 (“The [trial] court further ruled that K.M. did not meet the statutory definition of a ‘presumed’ mother [under section 7611(d)] because she had failed to meet both prongs
of the statutory test: receiving the children into her home, and holding them out as her natural
children. Although K.M. had received the twins into her home, she had not held them out as her
natural children . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 682 (“In light of our conclusion that section
7613(b) does not apply and that K.M. is the twins’ parent (together with E.G.), based upon K.M.’s
genetic relationship to the twins, we need not, and do not, consider whether K.M. is presumed to
be a parent of the twins under [section 7611(d)] . . . .”).
134 See id. at 677 (noting the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that at the time of conception,
both parties intended for E.G. to be the sole mother and parent, and therefore any changes to the
agreement after the birth did not alter the original scheme).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 682.
137 See generally id. at 678-82 (discussing California’s UPA and its interpretation in these two
cases).
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mother.138 Using Johnson as a template, the K.M. court shifted its focus from
biology and genetics to examine the parties’ intentions.139 In Johnson, as in
Buzzanca, the fact that the couples were married at the time their children
were conceived was crucial to the determination of parentage because it
evinced their intent to procreate and parent jointly as a couple.140 The facts
of K.M. seemed similar. Although K.M. and E.G. were ineligible to marry
in California, they were registered as domestic partners under a municipal
domestic partnership scheme141—a fact that, for the court, underscored the
way in which the couple functioned as a traditional family and “intended to
produce a child that would be raised in their own home.”142 With Johnson
and Buzzanca as guides, the K.M. court relied on biology and genetics,
filtered through the lens of intent, to declare both K.M. and E.G. to be
mothers under the UPA.143
But irrespective of intent to procreate and jointly parent in a committed,
state-recognized relationship, there were other reasons that counseled in
favor of recognizing K.M. as a parent—reasons that required the court to
retreat from an important aspect of its decision in Johnson. Recall that the
Johnson court roundly dismissed Anna Johnson’s claim of maternity in favor
138 See id. at 678 (“K.M. asserts that she is a parent of the twins because she supplied the ova
that were fertilized in vitro and implanted in her lesbian partner . . . .”).
139 See id. at 679 (“The circumstances of the present case are not identical to those in Johnson,
but they are similar in a crucial respect; both the couple in Johnson and the couple in the present
case intended to produce a child that would be raised in their own home.”).
140 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (emphasizing that the
parents were a married couple who sought to raise a child together within their marriage);
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998)
(emphasizing the mother’s and father’s consent as the basis for their legal-parent status in cases of
both artificial insemination and birth by surrogate mothers).
141 For a discussion of California municipal domestic partnership schemes, see Melissa
Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 291, 294-300 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, Paradigms Lost].
142 K.M., 117 P.3d at 679. In truth, the court made much—perhaps too much—out of the
parties’ registered partnership. As I have explained elsewhere, municipal domestic partnerships are
not—and were not—equivalents of marriage. See Murray, Paradigms Lost, supra note 141, at 295
(noting that municipal domestic partnership schemes “were not necessarily intended to be close
approximations of marriage”). In most cases, these municipal regimes offered a modest complement of benefits—not the full panoply of benefits and expectations attendant to marriage. Id.
Indeed, E.G. argued that she and K.M. had entered into the municipal domestic partnership
solely for the purpose of providing K.M. access to E.G.’s gym membership. Respondent’s Answer
Brief on the Merits at 3, K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (No. 02-0777).
143 See K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (concluding that K.M. and E.G.’s parental claims are “not
mutually exclusive” because “K.M. does not claim to be the twins’ mother instead of E.G., but in
addition to E.G.”); see also id. at 682 (concluding that section 7632 does not permit a “woman who
supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner . . . [to] waive her responsibility to
support that child”).
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of Crispina Calvert’s.144 Confidently declaring that “California law recognizes only one natural mother,”145 the Johnson court “rejected the suggestion
that . . . the child could have two mothers.”146 Instead, it relied on intent to
decide between the two women’s competing claims.147
In K.M., the court beat a hasty retreat from Johnson’s categorical imperative.148 Although Johnson cautioned against recognizing two mothers, the
K.M. court made clear that this logic was inapt in circumstances involving
same-sex partners.149 As the court explained, “our decision in Johnson does
not preclude a child from having two parents both of whom are women.”150
Thus while Johnson resisted finding more than two parents, K.M. resisted
finding fewer.
Although K.M. departed from Johnson by finding two mothers, the
court’s logic was consistent with the longstanding interest in ensuring a
stable family and stable, private sources of financial support for children.
This factor was less explicit in K.M. than in Buzzanca, Nicholas H., and
Karen C., where the courts were faced with the prospect of children who
would be wards of the court. In K.M., the financial circumstances were not
nearly as dire.151 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the K.M. court had
two options: it could either determine that K.M. was a parent, thus
providing the children with two parents (and two sources of support), or it
could credit E.G.’s reading of the UPA, which established her as the sole
parent of—and sole source of support for—her children.152
Given the connections between determining parentage and securing
private sources of support for children, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
K.M. court decided the case in a manner that ensured two parents—and two
sources of support—rather than one. In this way, the determination of
parentage was as much about attaching obligations as it was about
144 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (finding Anna’s biological connection insufficient to establish a
“mother and child relationship”).
145 Id. at 781.
146 K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (discussing Johnson); cf. id. (distinguishing Johnson’s facts and holding
that “K.M.’s parentage is determined by the usual provisions of the UPA”).
147 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (relying on the “parties’ intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement” to determine maternity).
148 See K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (noting that the “Johnson intent test does not apply when ‘[t]here
is no “tie” to break’” (quoting Moschetta v. Moschetta (In re Marriage of Moschetta), 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d 893, 896 (Ct. App. 1994))).
149 See id. (noting that the facts were distinguishable from Johnson because “both K.M. and
E.G. can be the children’s mothers”).
150 Id. (quoting Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005)).
151 As an initial matter, K.M. was not a dependency case.
152 K.M., 117 P.3d at 682 (prioritizing the child’s right to support and concluding that a parent
cannot sign a “waiver [that] effectively cause[s] that woman to relinquish her parental rights”).
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establishing rights. Furthermore, in choosing to credit K.M.’s reading of the
UPA and the extant case law over E.G.’s interpretation, the court
subordinated a reading of the UPA that enabled the creation of single-parent
families in favor of a broader public policy that prioritized the two-parent
family and the privatization of support.
The interest in encouraging two-parent families and facilitating the
privatization of support was even more explicit in Elisa B. v. Superior
Court,153 which the California Supreme Court heard as a companion case to
K.M. In Elisa B., Elisa and Emily were committed partners who wished to
raise a family together.154 Using Emily’s ova and donor sperm, the couple
pursued IVF and Emily eventually gave birth to twins.155 After their
children were born, the couple organized their household along traditional
lines.156 Emily left the workforce to remain at home, while Elisa worked to
support the family.157 Within a few years, however, the couple ended their
relationship. Although Emily continued to support the household for a
time, she eventually lost her job and was no longer able to contribute
financially.158 In order to support her children, Emily filed for public
assistance.159 When the county filed suit against Elisa to hold her financially
responsible for the children, Elisa argued that she was not a legal parent
because she was not biologically related to the twins.160
The California Supreme Court thought otherwise. Relying on its decision in Nicholas H., the court held that Elisa was a legal parent under
section 7611(d) of the UPA because “she received the children into her
home and openly held them out as her natural children.”161 Critically, the
couple’s marriage-like relationship furnished the backdrop against which the
court determined that Elisa was a lawful parent with attendant child
support obligations. As the court explained, the couple
introduced each other to friends as their “partner,” exchanged rings, opened
a joint bank account, and believed they were in a committed relationship.

153
154
155
156

117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 663.
Id.
See id. (explaining that the couple decided that Emily would be the “stay-at-home
mother” and Elisa the “primary breadwinner”).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 663-64; see also id. at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring) (noting that shortly after losing
her job, Elisa informed Emily that “because she no longer had a full-time job she could not
continue to support Emily and the twins”).
159 Id. at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 664 (majority opinion).
161 Id. at 670.
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Elisa and Emily discussed having children and decided that they both
wished to give birth. Because Elisa earned more than twice as much money
as Emily, they decided that Emily “would be the stay-at-home mother” and
Elisa “would be the primary breadwinner for the family.” At a sperm bank,
they chose a donor they both would use so the children would “be biological
brothers and sisters.”162

For the court, Elisa’s behavior in the context of a long-term, marriage-like
relationship made clear that she and Emily had planned to have and raise
children together. Regardless of the lack of a biological connection, Elisa’s
behavior signaled her intent to function as a parent.
In this respect, the circumstances of Elisa B. were consistent with those
in Nicholas H., where the court also concluded that biology was no barrier to
determining parenthood in circumstances where the individual functioned
in the manner of a parent in the context of a conjugal relationship.163 But
critically, the circumstances departed from Nicholas H. in a way that made
the recognition of Elisa’s parental status even more appropriate. The Elisa
B. court observed that, unlike Thomas and Kimberly in Nicholas H.,
Elisa did not meet Emily after she was pregnant, but rather was in a committed relationship with her when they decided to have children together.
Elisa actively assisted Emily in becoming pregnant, with the understanding
that they would raise the resulting children together. Having helped cause
the children to be born, and having raised them as her own, E[lisa] should
not be permitted to later abandon the twins simply because her relationship
with Emily dissolved.164

Thus, it was not just that Elisa had held the children out as her own, as
Thomas had in Nicholas H. Rather, like the Calverts and the Buzzancas,
Elisa and Emily deliberately had taken steps to conceive children and raise
them as a family in the context of a long-term relationship. This, as much as
her post-birth conduct, made Elisa a parent in the court’s eyes. Just as John
Buzzanca could not disclaim his obligations to Jaycee after consenting to the
surrogacy arrangement,165 Elisa could not now shirk her obligations to the
children she helped create.

162
163

Id. at 663.
Id.; cf. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d
932, 933 (Cal. 2002) (discussing a rebuttable presumption of parentage that arises when a man
“receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural child”).
164 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670.
165 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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Emily’s precarious financial situation also weighed heavily in the court’s
decision. Tellingly, Emily and their children were dependent on public
assistance.166 Such circumstances were exactly what the UPA was promulgated
to avoid. As the court explained, “the paternity presumptions are driven,
not by biological paternity, but by the state’s interest in the welfare of the
child and the integrity of the family.”167 When the UPA was drafted,
biological paternity provided the vehicle to further the state’s interest in
privatizing the welfare of children.168 But as these cases suggest, over time,
California courts constructed a model of parenthood that was not
dependent on biology alone. This model of parenthood was not only more
expansive in its understanding of parenthood, it offered multiple routes for
privatizing dependency and attaching parental obligations of support.
E. Jason P. v. Danielle S.
The most recent case to consider the UPA’s parentage provisions, Jason
P. v. Danielle S.,169 involved an unmarried couple who relied on assisted
reproductive technology in their quest to become parents. Jason and
Danielle tried to have a baby naturally, but after many complications,
turned to IVF.170 Shortly thereafter, Danielle moved out of the home she
shared with Jason, purchased sperm from an anonymous sperm donor, and
began “to pursue motherhood as a single mother.”171 She began by
researching her rights as a “single mother by choice,”172 learning that under
California law, “a man who gives his sperm for artificial insemination is
never treated in the law as though he is the father.”173 Eventually, however,
the couple reconciled and Jason gave Danielle a letter explaining that
although “he was not ready to be a father,” Danielle “had his blessing” to
use his sperm to conceive “as long as she did not tell others.”174 With these
166
167

Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id. at 668 (majority opinion) (quoting Kern Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Monica G.
(In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003)).
168 See Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360 (noting that the identification and
recognition of unmarried fathers paved the way for increased privatization of dependency).
169 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2014).
170 Id. at 791.
171 Id.
172 Id. The term “single mother by choice” has been popularized by the group “Single
Mothers by Choice.” For a discussion of the group and its aims, see SINGLE MOTHERS BY
CHOICE, http://www.singlemothersbychoice.org (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/9WA7-TULR. For a critique of the group and its terminology, see Murray, New
Illegitimacy, supra note 29, at 414-15.
173 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791.
174 Id. at 792.
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caveats issued, Danielle used Jason’s sperm to become pregnant via IVF.175
Their son, Gus, was born in December 2009.176 According to Jason, the
couple raised Gus together, and Jason publicly assumed a paternal role in
Gus’s life until 2012, when Danielle ended the relationship.177
When the relationship ended, Jason petitioned to establish his parental
rights.178 Danielle objected, arguing that under section 7613(b), Jason was a
sperm donor and therefore ineligible to be legally recognized as Gus’s
father.179 In response, Jason contended, among other things, that
section 7613(b) did not apply to a man who was in a relationship with the
woman who was using his sperm to conceive via IVF.180 He further argued
that he was a presumed parent under section 7611(d) because he had taken
Gus into his home and held him out to others as his natural child.181
In rendering its decision, the trial court relied on an earlier California
appellate decision, Steven S. v. Deborah D.182 There, a biological father was
denied the opportunity to establish paternity because, although he had been
in a relationship with the child’s mother, the child was conceived using
sperm that he had provided to a licensed physician for the purpose of
artificially inseminating the mother.183 According to the Jason P. trial court,
the facts in Jason P. were consistent with those of Steven S., in that “Jason’s
semen was provided to a licensed physician and surgeon, that Gus was
conceived through IVF using Jason’s sperm, and that [Jason] and Danielle
were never married.”184 According to the trial court, these facts, taken
together, “conclusively established that section 7613(b) applies.”185 Because
section 7613(b) was the “exclusive means of determining paternity in cases
involving sperm donors and unmarried women,” the trial court held that
Jason could not establish paternity as a presumed parent under
section 7611(d).186

175
176
177

Id.
Id.
See id. (describing the evidence that Jason presented concerning his involvement in Gus’s
upbringing during the first years of the child’s life).
178 Id. at 791.
179 Id.
180 Id.; see also id. at 792-93 (describing the trial court’s rejection of “Jason’s argument that
section 7613(b) does not apply”).
181 Id. at 791-93.
182 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (Ct. App. 2005).
183 Id. at 484.
184 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 793.
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On appeal, Jason contended that sections 7613(b) and 7611(d) operated as
independent grounds for establishing paternity.187 By this logic, even if
section 7613(b) applied, Jason could still establish paternity under
section 7611(d).188 Danielle, however, contended that, in keeping with the
decision in Steven S., Jason, as a mere sperm donor, was precluded from
establishing parentage “under any theory.”189 The appellate court disagreed,
noting that in Steven S., the “only issue . . . was whether section 7613(b)
applied when the sperm donor is an intimate friend and sexual partner of
the mother.”190 The Steven S. court did not confront the question “whether
section 7613(b) precluded a finding of parentage under section 7611 or any
other theory.”191
The critical question, then, was whether the two provisions interacted in
such a way that the application of one provision necessarily precluded
application of the other. Although prior decisions had not offered the
opportunity to consider sections 7613(b) and 7611(d) in tandem, nothing
established that the two provisions were mutually exclusive. Indeed, the
Jason P. court concluded, reading the two provisions together, “with
reference to the entire scheme of law,”192 would “promote rather than defeat
the [UPA’s] general purpose, . . . avoiding a construction that would lead to
absurd consequences.”193 According to the court, section 7613(b) had been
drafted for the purpose of allowing women, whether married or unmarried,
to conceive via artificial insemination “without fear that the [sperm] donor
may claim paternity.”194 Just as important, the provision “provided men
with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried
women alike without fear of liability for child support.”195
By contrast, section 7611’s presumptions were drafted for the purpose of
“distinguish[ing] between those fathers who have entered into some familial
relationship with the mother and child and those who have not.”196 Unlike
section 7613, which recognized that biology could be the basis of a parental
relationship (and thus sought to deny parentage in circumstances involving
sperm donors), section 7611 was guided by the understanding that “[a]

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id.
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 796 (citation omitted).
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biological connection to the child is not necessary for the presumption of
paternity to arise.”197 In this regard, construing the statutes such that the
application of section 7613(b) precluded the presumption of parenthood
under section 7611(d) would “lead to unintended, and some might say
absurd, consequences.”198 Under Danielle’s interpretation of the two
statutes, an ex-husband who had fathered a child via artificial insemination
would not be obligated “to support the child because he was a sperm donor
under section 7613(b) and could not be found to be the child’s presumed
father under section 7611, despite having been married to the mother at the
time of the child’s birth and having raised the child as his own.”199 Such an
interpretation would invariably lead to circumstances where children would
be left without any sources of support (or with very limited sources of
support), severely undermining the state’s interest in privatizing
dependency. As the Jason P. court confidently asserted, “[t]he Legislature
could not have intended this result.” 200 In this way, as in K.M., the
Jason P. court prioritized the recognition of two-parent families and the
privatization of support over the UPA’s stated interest in facilitating single
motherhood and other departures from the traditional model of marital
parenthood.
III. FAMILY LAW’S DOCTRINES
In the 1970s, when the UPA was drafted and later adopted in California
and other states, the model law’s interest in removing distinctions between
marital and nonmarital birth, and in going beyond marriage as a conduit
to establishing parentage, was widely regarded as a progressive development.201
But even as the UPA marked a significant moment of progressive change in
family law and policy by reducing the importance of marriage to
establishing family rights and responsibilities, it did so by prioritizing
biological connections and conduct that comported with behavior associated
with the marital family. In so doing, California’s UPA—and the courts
interpreting it—further reified, and indeed entrenched, certain aspects of
marital family life.
I raise these points because they respond to the essential question that is
at the core of this Symposium: what is the role and place of legal doctrine
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 797.
Id.
See Wald, supra note 18, at 141 (discussing the UPA’s intention to “guarantee the equal
rights of all children”).

2015]

Family Law’s Doctrines

2013

today? In the family law context, as we have seen, doctrine abounds. But as
California’s experience with the UPA suggests, doctrine is often
ill-equipped to deal with the varied realities of quotidian life. When the
UPA was drafted, it responded to a quite limited vision of family life. As
the UPA’s drafters understood, families were being forged in and outside of
marriage202—a development to which the extant family law, with its marital
presumptions, remained stubbornly resistant. But even as the UPA tried to
reboot family law for a new era, it immediately confronted the dramatic
shifts in the terrain of family formation that ARTs and same-sex relationships
posed.
As the case law makes clear, in the face of modernity, resort to
doctrine alone yielded unsatisfying—indeed, absurd—results. Accordingly,
California courts molded the doctrine to meet the exigencies of the
circumstances with which they were confronted. In Johnson and Buzzanca,
the logic of intentional parenthood emerged to respond to the difficulties
presented by surrogacy and ARTs. In Nicholas H., K.M., and Elisa B.,
doctrine was molded to accommodate circumstances scarcely contemplated
at the time the UPA was drafted. In this regard, California’s experience
with the UPA makes clear that doctrine does matter, but that doctrine can
be interpreted and realigned in ways that comport with evolving
circumstances.
What is perhaps less obvious in these cases is the way in which
“doctrine” operates on multiple levels in family law. All of the cases involve
courts grappling with established doctrine in the form of judge-made case
law and statutory provisions. But, as importantly, in all of the cases, the
courts confront—and embrace—a set of doctrinal truths that informs and
shapes the development of case law and the interpretation of statutes.
Throughout the cases canvassed here, the California courts evince concern
for three distinct but interrelated interests: (1) limiting parenthood to two
persons, (2) establishing conjugal relationships as the essential context in
which reproduction occurs, and (3) confirming the family’s role in privatizing
dependency. I will say a bit about each of these in turn.
Almost from the start, the development of ARTs raised the prospect of
parenthood divided among more than the traditional husband–wife dyad.
The anxiety surrounding multiple parenthood is most evident in Johnson,
where two women vied to be recognized as the child’s mother.203 In Johnson,
the court dismissed out of hand the prospect of recognizing two women as
202 See Polikoff, supra note 28, at 211-12 (discussing the UPA’s focus on removing the distinction between marital and nonmarital children).
203 See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
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the child’s mother.204 Crediting the claims of one woman would invariably
diminish the rights of the other.205 The California Supreme Court later
revisited this logic in K.M. This time, the court abandoned its resistance to
the prospect of a child with two mothers, noting that parenthood could be
divided between two persons, and that both of these persons could be of the
same gender.206
The K.M. court’s retreat from Johnson has largely been received as a
progressive development.207 And in many respects, the court’s recognition
that a child can have two legal parents of the same sex is progress. What this
progress narrative masks, however, is the court’s underlying conservatism
about family structure. Although the K.M. court happily recognized two
women as legal mothers, it avoided the prospect of single motherhood and
never admitted the possibility of multiple parenthood. Indeed, even as it
expanded upon the traditional familial model to include two parents of the
same sex, the court’s notion of parenthood was deeply rooted in the
conventional two-parent dyad and the traditional heterosexual organization
of the family.
In this regard, the cases also evince an understanding that conjugal relationships, whether in marriage or outside of it, are the paradigmatic context
in which reproduction occurs—and should occur. Recall that in Buzzanca,
K.M., Elisa B., and Jason P., the fact that a child was conceived in the
context of an intact relationship informed the court’s determination that the
parties intended to raise the child jointly as co-parents.208 This development
recalls the marital presumption that pervaded the law of parentage that
preceded the UPA. At that time, the fact that a child was born to a woman
204 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (noting that “for any child
California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology
rendering a different outcome biologically possible”).
205 See id. at 786 (“Any parental rights Anna might successfully assert could come only at
Crispina’s expense.”).
206 See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005) (distinguishing Johnson’s facts from its
holding).
207 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 18, at 153 (“Specifically, in [K.M.] the court held that when a
couple deliberately brings a child into the world through the use of assisted reproduction, both
partners are the parents, regardless of their gender or marital status.”).
208 See, e.g., K.M., 117 P.3d at 675 (describing the relationship between the parents as a cohabitating partnership); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 791 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting that
Jason and Danielle “cohabitated for many years, but they never married”); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca
(In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998) (“If a husband who
consents to artificial insemination . . . is ‘treated in law’ as the father of the child by virtue of his
consent, there is no reason the result should be any different in the case of a married couple who
consent to in vitro fertilization by unknown donors and subsequent implantation into a woman
who is, as a surrogate, willing to carry the embryo to term for them.”).
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in an intact marriage was sufficient to raise the presumption that the
woman’s husband was the child’s father.209 The UPA, however, sought to
expand the view of legal parentage beyond marriage to include those
families formed through nonmarital relationships. Despite these aspirations,
intuitions about marriage and marital family norms continued to influence
and inform the courts’ view of nonmarital parenthood. As the case law
suggests, the parties did not need to be married for the court to assume that
reproduction was undertaken with the understanding that both parties
would raise the child together. Instead, the mere fact that a conjugal
relationship existed at the time the child was conceived was sufficient for
the court to infer an intent to co-parent and confirm parental rights.
Critically, the interest in limiting parenthood to two persons and recognizing conjugal relationships as the appropriate context for reproduction
both relate to another “truth” that is threaded throughout all of the cases.
Concern for the financial provision of children shadows the cases and the
courts’ dispositions of the issues. The emphasis on financial support as a
crucial obligation and responsibility of parenthood is perhaps unsurprising.
These concerns were present during the drafting of the UPA, when the
interest in establishing parentage among unmarried couples was explicitly
linked to identifying fathers for the purpose of imposing child support
obligations.210 Put simply, the family has long been the principal means by
which we privatize the dependency of children (and other vulnerable
subjects), relieving the state of the obligation to do so.
This essential truth of family life is laid bare in the resolution of cases
like Buzzanca, Nicholas H., and Elisa B., where the courts were concerned
about the prospect of interpreting legal doctrine in a manner that produced
such “absurd[ities]”211 as children who were legal orphans or otherwise
dependent on the state for their care and provision.212
The impulse toward the privatization of dependency is perhaps less
obvious in cases like Johnson and Jason P., where there was no immediate

209 See Wald, supra note 18, at 140 (discussing common law marital presumptions, which
aimed “to restrict childbearing to the confines of marriage”).
210 See id. at 141 (noting that securing child support payments was a major policy goal of the
UPA).
211 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795 (citation omitted).
212 See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the financial
responsibility for the children rested with Elisa and was “not the responsibility of the taxpayer”);
Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal.
2002) (noting that if paternity were not established for the nonbiological father, the “harsh result”
would render the child “fatherless and homeless”); Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284 (noting the
“lack of appeal for any result which makes [the child] a legal orphan”).
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concern that the child would be rendered a ward of the state.213
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that concerns about the
economic welfare of children do not pervade the decisions in these cases.
Recall the Johnson court’s concern that recognizing Anna Johnson as a
mother would invariably intrude upon the rights of Crispina Calvert and
her husband.214 We might speculate that the court was not only concerned
about the conflict of rights and its effect on the parties’ abilities to raise the
child; it likely was also concerned that the Calverts would find the
imposition of a third rights-holder untenable in the long run, perhaps
prompting them to eventually surrender their rights to Johnson, who would
be left as the sole source of support for the child. With these concerns in
mind, one might attribute the court’s hostility to the prospect of three
parents to a preference for the perceived economic stability of the marital
family and a desire to protect this source of support from destabilizing
forces.
And this preference for the traditional family unit as a means of
providing support for children may well explain the California Supreme
Court’s retreat from Johnson in K.M. and Elisa B. In both cases, the court
easily surmounted Johnson’s concern for vesting legal motherhood in two
women by analogizing the litigants and their relationships to the
heterosexual family unit.215 Parenthood was limited to two people, but both
parents could be mothers. We might attribute the court’s about-face to a
simple acknowledgement of modernity and the changing dynamics of the
family. But crucially, the court’s decisions were about more than the
increasing visibility of same-sex co-parents. The court was also likely
swayed by the prospect of ensuring two sources of support for the child—of
replicating the structure of the marital family, even if that structure was no
longer rooted in heterosexual marriage and reproduction.216
213 Notably, neither case was a dependency proceeding. In all circumstances, there were
adults willing to care for the child. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc);
Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791.
214 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
215 See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the mothers were in a
domestic partnership); Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 (describing the relationship’s traditional familial
structure).
216 Given the interest in privatizing support for children within the family, why were the
California courts so disdainful of the prospect of multiple parenthood? After all, if two parents
were important as sources of economic provision, three or more parents would further amortize
the costs of dependency. One might argue that multiple parenthood posed risks associated with
diffuse ownership rights—the classic tragedy of the commons. If a number of people were vested
with the rights of parenthood, we might worry about whether all of them were performing their
parental obligations at full capacity all of the time. We might also worry that an increase in the
number of legal parents will lead to increased conflicts over child-rearing decisions, perhaps
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But why was it so important for the court to assure two sources of
support for children? The circumstances of Elisa B. suggest one pressing
reason for affirming the two-parent dyad and the structure of the traditional
family. Recall that in Elisa B., Emily, Elisa’s former partner, left the
workforce to raise the couple’s children.217 When the relationship ended,
Emily and the children were utterly dependent on Elisa for material
support.218 When Elisa withdrew her support, Emily and her children
became public charges, dependent on the state.219 These kinds of dire
circumstances made the value of two parents obvious, at least to the court.
Two parents, “rather than one,” could serve “as a source of both emotional
and financial support”—especially in circumstances, like Elisa B.’s, “when
the obligation to support the child would otherwise fall to the public.”220 In
this regard, Elisa B. is not simply about reifying the two-parent dyad. It is
about reifying the two-parent dyad as a means of ensuring that the family
will continue, even in the event of relationship dissolution, to be a means
for privatizing dependency.
CONCLUSION
All of these observations gesture toward an important insight: doctrine
may take many forms in law. We might assume that “doctrine” is limited to
case law, statutes, and regulations, but these cases suggest that, at least in
the context of family law, there are other “doctrines” that form the
backdrop against which law is interpreted, created, and received. Even as
family law doctrine has attempted to respond to the changing nature of
family life, certain truths remain fixed as bedrock principles that subtly—
and not so subtly—inform the work of judges and legislatures. In these
cases, the prioritization of the two-parent dyad and conjugal relationships as
the site for reproduction is undergirded by an interest in preserving the
family (however constituted) as the means by which society provides and
cares for its most vulnerable. With this in mind, the question whether
doctrine survives as a force in legal decisionmaking is easy to answer.
Obviously, doctrine matters. The harder question, of course, is which
leading to instability in the family unit. Elizabeth Marquardt, a vocal critic of multiple
parenthood, has voiced similar concerns. See Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed., When 3 Really Is A
Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A13 (“Conflicts will undoubtedly arise when three parents
confront the sticky, conflict-ridden reality of child-raising, often leading to a nasty, three-way
custody battle.”).
217 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
220 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669.
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doctrines matter—and how? As family law suggests, case law and statutes
continue to be meaningful, but at their core, these doctrinal sources are
informed and influenced by other core “truths.”

